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LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE FOREIGNNESS OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
By KINGMAN BREWSTER JR.*
Crystal gazing seems fair sport for an anniversary occasion. I take
it that the theme of this gathering and the focus of its discussion testifies
to the belief that the crucial international legal relations of the next fifty
years will burst the bounds traditionally described by either public or
private international law, narrowly defined. Since law, especially Ameri-
can law, is a problem solving process, it can be expected that the chal-
lenges and advances of international legal relations over the next fifty
years will spring from the international problems which lawyers are
asked to help solve. So in searching for the future direction in the
international economic field we might well ask what are the top priority
problems to which our profession might contribute a solution?
The economic dilemmas and opportunities which Dr. Diamond
has so ably portrayed are so overwhelming, so dramatic, that it is easy
to lose track of the law in them. The law's role in economic develop-
ment is so obvious, so taken for granted, that it rarely receives special
analysis. But if savings are to be translated into investment-the essence
of the economics of growth-the saver must have legally enforceable
assurance that the investor will be accountable to him. What, then, are
the special problems posed for this law job when savings in one country
are sought for investment in another?
Of course I cannot adequately answer my own question. But I
would like to point out some problems and perhaps suggest some emphasis
which are too often neglected. Perhaps it will help if we think separately
of the challenge to the private lawyer-the business counsellor and nego-
tiator-; the challenge to the public lawyer concerned with the regula-
tion of business; and the challenge to what might be called the promotive
lawyer-the lawyer concerned with directly stimulating the kind of
economic development Dr. Diamond was speaking about.
Foreignness and the private lawyer
Perhaps the most enduring, certainly the most pervasive construc-
tive contribution the American legal profession can make to international
economic legal relations is in the day-to-day exercise of traditional
professional ingenuity in devising the numberless credit, licensing and
investment transactions without which no investment would be offered or
accepted.
Superficial surmise might lead some to believe that the American
counsellor is less important in an international transaction than in a
domestic one because of the foreignness of foreign business. My impres-
sion is quite the contrary. The reasons are not hard to fathom. First, of
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course, the American lawyer knows better than any foreign lawyer
possibly can the interests, needs, legal possibilities and legal limitations of
an American investor. Second, and perhaps more important, two hun-
dred years of business counselling across state lines in the world's fastest
growing economy have vested the American legal profession with a tradi-
tion of architectural ingenuity and a variety of experience which is itself
an important reservoir of "knowhow." Of course it has its counterparts
in other developed countries, if not always in law, in other callings
related to business and finance. But, especially in the development of
less mature economies, the American lawyer can be expected to help
creatively in devising the instruments and institutional arrangements
which large scale capital formation requires. It is not a question of
exporting the American legal system. Rather, it is an opportunity to
adapt whatever may be useful from our own experience to systems which
may never have contemplated the demands and possibilities of large and
complex capital transactions. Examples come to mind. Flexibility in amount
and form of the capitalization of an enterprise may seem hamstrung by
some aspects of the traditional civil law company laws. Our experience
with convertible debentures, stock options, escrow agreements, voting trusts
and no par value stock may suggest possibilities consistent with but not
contemplated by local law. In face of the often understandable resistance
to foreign ownership, licensing arrangements, management and technical
service contract possibilities may permit the devising of "investments by
contract" which will satisfy the needs of the investor's security and still
be palatable to the desire for local ownership. In the area of "know-
how" licensing especially there is great economic promise which may
be enhanced by trying to draw upon the suggestive experience of equity
jurisprudence in general and the special concepts of unfair competition
in particular. In the field of minerals development, there is the crucial
challenge to legal ingenuity posed by the investor's interest in long run
assurance of control and product availability on the one hand and the
resource country's fear of exploitation on the other. In face of rising
"resource nationalism," almost always buttressed by the foreign state's
legal title to the subsoil, traditional concepts of ownership may be a less
important form of security than concession agreement drawn with the
foresight which minimizes friction by anticipating the interests which are
bound to conflict if exploration brings in a "find" exceeding the initial
expectations of both parties.
Throughout the gamut of the most crucial investment relationships,
then, the American lawyer faces a challenge to his talent certainly com-
parable to, if not greater than, the challenge posed by the development
of the United States. Precisely because of the tradition of the American
corporate bar, which sees the lawyer as planner, counsellor, negotiator,
as well as draftsman and advocate, the challenge is perhaps at the top
of our agenda.
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Foreignness and regulatory law
If all law is "territorial" it might be asked why are one country's
investments in another any concern of its regulatory law? Why should
"foreignness" have anything to do with government control of business.
Territoriality made understandable sense when the Harvard Research
produced its draft convention on jurisdiction with respect to crime in
1935.1 It may still make sense, but the strains upon it could not have
been contemplated by an International Court adjudicating the power of
the Turkish government to determine the responsibilities of the French
officer of the watch on the S.S. Lotus when Turkish sailors were killed
in a collison with a Turkish vessel on the high seas.' In a world where
most nations' standards of living and national security alike depend so
heavily on what goes on in other countries it is inevitable that a nation's
law should be tempted to reach out to govern the activities abroad which
affect it-especially the activities of its own nationals. The enforcement
of a freely competitive market at the one extreme or the maintenance
of effective export, import, or exchange control at the other extreme
alike may urge an effort to hold nationals, residents or even foreigners
to account for the conduct of their foreign commercial and monetary
affairs.
Notions of exclusive jurisdiction on a territorial basis cannot answer
the problems posed by the multi-national transaction and the multi-na-
tional corporation. "Proper law" rules may offer a clue, but concepts
adequate for contract, tort, and family law cannot adequately govern
relations among parties and governments when the state feels that a
crucial national economic interest is at stake. One example will suffice.
We might insist in the name of mutual security that it is proper at least
to attempt to govern shipments of strategic goods to the cold war enemy
by any foreign affiliate of an American national or resident.3 But we
would probably object strenuously if an Arab state told an American oil
concessionnaire that he could not ship oil to Israel produced by him in
Venezuela. Such dramatic incidents will of course not be solved by legal
concept. But if an economically interdependent alliance of free nations
with competing economic interests and contrasting economic policies is to
achieve a normal harmony beyond the needs of crisis, some rationale
must emerge which takes account of the foreign extension and impact
of regulatory law.
'oreignness and economic aid.
Private international legal relations and conflict of regulatory law
may not seem to have anything to do with the larger issue of worlu1
economic development to which Dr. Diamond addressed his thoughtful
129 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp. 2) 437 (1935)
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paper. However, it is fair to guess that private international investment
and the legal context in which it functions will have its vital contribution
to make to the world's chances for economic growth alongside of public
international investment or the other governmental devices loosely called
foreign aid.
I suspect that I am more favorably inclined toward public inter-
national lending, public technical assistance, and intergovernmental
grants than are the majority of my fellow countrymen. And I accept
Dr. Diamond's persuasive analysis of the obstacles to large scale private
international developmental investment. However, I would like to sug-
gest some of the reasons why traditional intergovernmental aid along
Marshall Plan lines seem to me also an inadequate solution. To keep
to my chosen theme, it has to do with the foreignness of foreign aid. To
look at the other side of Dr. Diamond's coin, it has to do with the "cli-
mate" of the investing, the developed countries, particularly the United
States. The grantor's state of mind is no less a fact of international eco-
nomic life than is the attitude of the recipients of investment.
The political symptoms of reluctance to engage in massive foreign
assistance are familiar; first, we do not want to pay more taxes or
inflate domestic prices; second, we do not think that the grantor-grantee
relationship is conducive to the good political relations which are among
the reasons for the aid in the first place. Whatever may be the truth of
these assertions, I think they do not adequately express the fundamental,
and I would say proper, basis for skepticism about massive public inter-
national investment or grant aid.
a) Dispersion of initiative.
The American presumption in favor of private enterprise is more
than an inherited bias. It is a conviction borne of relative success. Although
too often couched in terms of private rights, it also expresses a rational
notion that more is likely to get done faster if you have a dispersion of
separate centers of initiative devoting their energies and imaginations to
the same problem, than if you have initiative dependent on the permission
of central authority demanding conformity to its plan. Also practical action
judgments and decisions may well be better made by the people actually
working close to the problem than by those at some remote central
bureau.
Now obviously the presumption can be overridden, especially in
those jobs and areas where there is no opportunity to give play to com-
peting judgment and enterprise, or those areas where the calculus of
the private fair return cannot operate because it is not feasible to
charge through the market mechanism all those who benefit. But the pre-
sumption remains, and a rational, long-run economic footing can be
claimed for it.
b) Dispersion of blame
In the last analysis, the economic basis for the free enterprise method
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of economic organization and operation may be less significant than its
social and political underpinning. To put it most simply, it is the notion
that when things turn out badly, it is better to have resentment local-
ized and distributed than to have it fester into an eruption which may
rip apart the entire political, social and economic fabric. Best of all it
hopes that failure will, as often as possible, be a matter of self blame. At
worst it urges that disappointment should not give rise to a justified feel-
ing that opportunity was rigged by private status or public favor.
c) Foreignness and dispersion of initiative
Such large concepts so crudely over-simplified must surely seem far
removed from the challenge which foreignness poses for foreign aid.
However, if among our ultimate objectives in foreign economic policy
is the speedy creation of capital and managerial potential, and the creation
and maintenance of political stability and the minimizing of justified
resentment against the haves by the have-nots, the rationale I have
suggested for the private enterprise approach takes on special meaning
in the international context.
Much is heard about attaching no strings to foreign aid. However,
even if economic assistance is properly divorced from crude demands for
military alliance or demands for groveling gratitude, there is no such
thing as the "stringless" loan or grant. No politically accountable keeper
of the public purse pan, or should, afford to be unconcerned with getting
the people their money's worth, even if that worth is defined in most
laudable, disinterested terms. Programming and rationing choices have to
be made. Each increment or modification of the original plan must be
newly justified. Performance has to be checked. Audits have to be
required. Initiative must wait upon approval at the desks of government
economists and engineers and comptrollers.
The red tape of advance approval can be minimized if, as in the
Marshall Plan, assistance can be furnished to developed industrial
economies through normal banking channels. Specific investment
decisions can then be left to the rationing of the normal functioning com-
mercial market. But when assistance is bestowed upon economies which
in common parlance are underdeveloped, the recipient government must
turn around and through its political processes directly hire from abroad
much of the talent it needs. So, advance selection and ex-post check up
must be made by two governments, both politically accountable to their
ever vigilant often scapegoat-minded opposition critics. Freedom of
initiative from direct political accountability may in this context be even
more crucial between nations than within them. At least it may under-
score a presumption in its favor, albeit rebuttable in many cases of social
overhead investment which cannot be made to charge its users for its cost.
d) Foreignness and dispersion of blame
Within any democratic country the drawbacks of public investment
or public lending can be mitigated by the representative political process.
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Wasteful error of planning or management, or egregious favoritism can
receive its retribution at the polls. Resentment there may be, but it can
find its own orderly cure.
In the international context, however, the essence of "foreignness"
is that neither grantor nor grantee has an acknowledged voice in the
political process of the other. Even if there were no risks of spendthrift
waste or abusive favoritism (common enough in even the most mature
politics), planners, disbursing officers, contractors, managers, engineers are
fallible. In any job as large as that of trying to create the means to a decent
life for the world's underprivileged majority, there are going to be mistakes
-reasonable, normal, human, expensive mistakes. It is vital that the dis-
appointment at best and resentment at worst which will fester in the minds
of those who gave, those who received and those who asked but were
turned down not be directed by the peoples and government of one
nation against the peoples and government of another, any more than
absolutely necessary. Yet in a regime of massive intergovernmental
lending which departs from banking criteria what is more normal than
for each government to deflect its peoples' criticism to the other govern-
ment or governments involved?
Dispersion of blame among channels of private bargaining is even
more important internationally than at home.
The challenge of foreignness to foreign economic policy, a projection by
way of conclusion.
Unfortunately, I agree with Dr. Diamond's gloomy analysis of the
barriers to private international investment. Since I also agree with my
own gloomy analysis of the obstacles to very large scale public interna-
tional loans or grants, I am not left in a very constructive posture in
which to face the human challenge of economic development, dramatized
by but scarcely created by the Soviet's economic bid for the allegiance
of the uncommitted world.
However, political wisdom and legal ingenuity in the devising of
techniques helped bring us through the Great Depression and the Total
War without sacrificing our fundamental rationale of social and economic
organization. Many of the values of the privateness of private business
have been maintained even while inducing it to do things in the public in-
terest by techniques of loan, guaranty, and subsidy. Such techniques of
"riskless capitalism" have their own notorious drawbacks-windfall
profits and domestic political favoritism not the least among them. Per-
haps worst of all is the favor that doesn't induce anything, or which
goes to those who would have acted anyway.4 On the other hand assistance
which too narrowly defines the risk coverage or which requires inter-
minable negotiations with government may well rob the inducement
4 My own impression of many proposals to exempt foreign income from
U. S. Taxes.
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of its effect and deprive the private enterprise of the initiative which is
its justification. 5
Concrete solutions naturally defy generalization, for foreign in-
vestment in the public interest is many distinct things. My own notions
are too underdeveloped to warrant your prolonged attention or my risk
of their incomplete statement. However, to point the direction of thought
which seems to me useful:
(1) I would think the FHA loan guaranty approach, including
intra-corporate loans, would do much to afford American firms the lever-
age position which would induce the foreign investment not only of dollars
but of scarce technical and managerial personnel. These are sorely needed
for their general contribution of technical and entrepreneurial skill whether
or not the enterprise itself would rate high on a planner's priority list.
(2) In the area of public service investment, or investment in any
industry which is such a fulcrum of a nation's economy that perpetual
foreign ownership may be unpalatable, it is not impossible that an
initially private investment could be made subject to an "anticipatory
nationalization agreement" whereby a royalty, fee, or profit-sharing in-
terest in the going concern value of the enterprise could be assured the
investor even if he were, after some stated period, deprived of the symbol
of ownership.
(3) In the area of raw materials the problem seems to me quite
special. No spur is needed to cultivate an interest in investment. Rather,
the problem is to induce resource countries to accept investment and
permit it to remain on reasonable terms once reserves are brought into
being and production. Here perhaps the approach should be to find a way
whereby the investor could be the conduit for social overhead and other
developmental investment which an underdeveloped resource country
sorely wants. This, however, would involve political as well as economic
and financial risks which inhibit me from saying more until it is better
thought through.
These notions would require much more amplification and testing
before they could rise to the dignity of definite proposals. They are
offered here only in an illustrative sense, to indicate that there is still room
for constructive response to what seems to me the crucial challenge posed
by the foreignness of both foreign aid and foreign private investment.
r My own impression of the reason for the relative inconsequence of the
U. S. government offer to guarantee against inconvertibility of foreign earnings
and expropriation of foreign assets.
